Foreign Direct Investment in Zimbabwe: The Role of Institutional Factors by Farayi Gwenhamo
 




Foreign Direct Investment in Zimbabwe:  









Working Paper Number 144 
                                                 
1 School of Economics, University of Cape Town, email: farayi.gwenhamo@uct.ac.za 
2 I would like to thank the Economics Research Southern Africa (ERSA) for their financial support. I 
also wish to thank Johannes Fedderke, Tony Leiman, the unanimous ERSA referee, faculty members 
and participants at the Ronald Coase Conference on Institutional Analysis (Philippines, Los Banos, 
2008) , in particular, Veneta Andonova, Mary Shirley, Colin Xu for their valuable comments. All 





The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of property rights on foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Zimbabwe for the period 1964-2005. While the macroeconomic determinants of FDI have been
analysed to a considerable extent in past empirical work, the role of institutional factors such as the
protection of property rights and the e¢ ciency of the legal system has been underexplored. Using a
multivariate cointegration framework, the paper employs a newly constructed de jure property rights
index for Zimbabwe to determine the impact of property rights on FDI. The empirical evidence shows
that property rights are consistently an important explanatory variable of FDI in Zimbabwe, even after
controlling for periods when there are no signi￿cant new foreign capital in￿ ows. Other signi￿cant ex-
planatory variables of FDI in Zimbabwe are the real gross domestic product (GDP), capital intensity,
the external debt to GDP ratio, political instability as well as the educational levels.
KEY WORDS: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Property rights, Cointegration and Zimbabwe
JEL Codes: F21, K11
1 Introduction
Most African countries face a shortage of funds to meet their investment needs. This is attributed to the low
levels of private savings that these countries face. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) (2000) estimated that in order to reach a sustainable economic growth rate of 6% per annum,
the domestic investment rate levels in the Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) region have to increase to about 25%
from the levels reached during the 1990s of less than 20%. Foreign capital in￿ ows are therefore considered
important for plugging the domestic resource gap in these countries.1
It is then often advised that developing and emerging economies should direct their e⁄orts towards attract-
ing FDI, which is seen as an important vehicle of technical progress. By introducing advanced technology,
management practices and improved production techniques, it is argued that FDI can improve productiv-
ity (Borensztein et al. 1998). Furthermore, FDI is viewed as relatively stable during ￿nancial crises when
compared to short-term foreign capital in￿ ows (Prasad et al. 2003). The growth-enhancing e⁄ects of FDI,
however, depend on the absorptive capacity of the recipient country, which in turn depends on educational
levels and the development of the ￿nancial markets, among other factors.2
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1An important related question is what are the key determinants of FDI in developing countries and
SSA, in particular? While the macroeconomic determinants of FDI to developing countries have been
analysed to a considerable extent3, there has been a recent shift of focus to the role of the host country￿ s
institutional environment. The FDI-institutions link debate borrows from the broader analysis of the impact
of institutions on economic development. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature asserts that
rules and regulations, which de￿ne and enforce property rights, enhance economic performance because they
reduce transaction costs and uncertainty. In line with this argument, Benassy-Quere et al (2007) proposed
that institutions a⁄ect FDI through their in￿ uence on productivity prospects, investment-related transaction
costs and uncertainty.
Zimbabwe presents an interesting case to test the role of property rights in the determination of FDI.
Post-1990, the Zimbabwean government undertook several changes to the legislation governing access to land
and land resources. From the international investors￿point of view, these legislative changes posed a serious
threat to the institution of private property. In contrast, during an earlier period (between 1980 and 1990),
the government adopted a market-based land reform programme. This entailed the government purchasing
land for purposes of resettlement from white commercial farmers and transnational companies (TNCs) at
the market prices and on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis.
The market-based land reform was entrenched for the ￿rst ten years of independence in accordance
with the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution adopted at independence in 1980. The lapsing
of the ten-year constitutional protection of private property in 1990 enabled the government to abandon
the market based system for a government-led compulsory land acquisition programme. The ￿rst phase of
reforms (1990 - late 1990s) saw the government enacting laws that removed the willing-buyer, willing-seller
basis for compulsory acquisition. However, compensation was still guaranteed for all land acquired by the
government.
In the late 1990s, the government embarked on the second phase of reforms which was more radical.
To set up the legal framework for the second phase, the government undertook several legislative reforms
which removed compensation for the acquired land. The new property laws allowed the government to easily
expropriate privately owned land for redistribution purposes without compensating the private owners. More
recently, the government also approved legislative reforms allowing the nationalisation of foreign ￿rms in all
sectors of the economy.4 While the Zimbabwean government argues that the changes are aimed at correcting
the historically skewed access to productive resources inherited from the colonial regime, it is plausible that
the resulting high expropriation risk among other factors negatively impacted on FDI in￿ ows which fell from
a record high level of US$ 444 million in 1998 to an annual average of less than US$ 100 million in the
subsequent years.5
The objective of this paper is to undertake an empirical investigation of the impact of property rights on
FDI in Zimbabwe for the period 1964 to 2005. An empirical investigation of this nature faces the classical
problem of how to measure the status of property rights. Although there are several property rights indices
such as those produced by the Fraiser Institute and the Heritage Foundation, their time coverage is too short
for any meaningful use in country-speci￿c time-series studies. To overcome this constraint, we make use of
newly constructed de jure property rights index in Gwenhamo et al (2008). The index tracks the changes
in legislation governing property rights and its￿time coverage is su¢ cient for the purposes of this study.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two provides a brief background to foreign capital in
Zimbabwe. Section three presents the theoretical framework underlying our empirical model. This is followed
by a review of empirical literature in section four. Section ￿ve provides a description of the econometric
3See, for example, Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Schneider and Frey (1985), Singh and Jun (1995) and Asiedu (2002, 2005).
4In May 2008, the government passed the Economic Empowerment Act facilitating nationalisation of foreign owned ￿rms
for redistribution purposes.
5See, for example, arguments in Richardson (2006).
2methodology employed. The estimation results and analysis are presented in section six. Section seven
concludes the paper with some policy implications.
2 A Brief Overview of FDI in Zimbabwe in the Post-Independence
Era.
At the time of independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwean government adopted a highly controlled and
inward looking economy. Foreign capital constituted about 70% of the total capital stock and FDI dominated
foreign capital in￿ ows (Clarke, 1980). In the ￿rst ten years of independence, the new government continued
with highly interventionist economic policies inherited from the colonial regime. The business environment
was highly regulated through a system of price controls, labour market restrictions and investment control
procedures. Approvals of foreign investors￿proposals involved an excessively long process. Foreign ￿rms were
required to get permission from the Foreign Investment Centre for the development of any new enterprises in
Zimbabwe. Ownership restrictions in some sectors required at least 30% local participation in an enterprise.
Policies on repatriation of pro￿ts also remained restrictive. Because of the policy environment, which was
unfavourable to foreign investors, FDI in￿ ows were very low during the ￿rst decade of independence. This
occurred despite secure property rights prevailing in Zimbabwe at that time.
As the government came to grips with persistently low levels of ￿xed capital formation in the late 1980s,
the attitude and policies towards foreign investors began to change. In 1989, a new investment code was
adopted. The result was to increase the proportion of after-tax pro￿ts that Multinational Companies (MNCs)
could repatriate from 50% to 100%. In 1990, the government adopted the IMF-funded Economic Structural
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) designed to eliminate economic policies of controls and restrictions. Pro-
motion of FDI was one of the key areas and policy was designed to achieve increased in￿ ows of FDI.
[Insert table 1 about here]
In 1992, as part of the structural reform, the Zimbabwe Investment Center (ZIC) was established as a
one stop shop for investment approvals. Tari⁄ and tax exemptions were also o⁄ered to encourage foreign
capital investments, transfer of technology, the utilisation of local raw materials, the development of rural
areas and the use of labour-intensive production techniques. Foreign ￿rms geared towards exporting also
bene￿ted from the export processing zones incentives in the form of tax holidays and customs free trade.
The return to a liberal economy and enthusiastic promotion of FDI resulted in the surge of FDI in￿ ows
averaging above US$50 million per year between 1990 and 1997. In 1998, FDI in￿ ows reached a record high
of US$ 444 million, as shown in ￿gure 1.
[Insert ￿gure 1 about here]
The sharp surge in FDI in￿ ows in 1998 was partly driven by the privatisation and liberalisation wave in
the Zimbabwean economy. This saw substantial ￿ ows of foreign capital particularly from South African ￿rms
into various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. Table 2 gives the details of some of the major transactions
that took place in 1998.
[Insert table 2 about here]
In the late 1990s, the country began to experience political instability and macroeconomic imbalances.
Investor con￿dence was further rattled in 2000 when compulsory farm acquisitions enabled by an Act of
parliament began. The sudden reversal of FDI ￿ ows coupled with falling domestic investment had depressing
e⁄ects on the gross ￿xed formation which fell from a record high of 25% of GDP in 1995 to only 17% of
GDP by 2005.
33 Theoretical Framework
The paper adopts the Fedderke (2002) portfolio theoretical model to underpin the interaction between FDI
and property rights. The core drivers of FDI fall into two classes of determinants namely the rate of return
and risk factors. There are positive responses to the rates of return and negative responses to risk. The
model de￿nes the expected return on a portfolio of capital assets faced by an agent as
E (R) = DR ￿ DC + FR ￿ FC (1)
where DR and DC are the expected return on domestic and foreign capital assets respectively and FR and FC
are the cost of adjustment of domestic and foreign asset holdings respectively. Costs of adjustment arise due
to information and transaction costs associated with altering the composition of the capital asset portfolios.
Returns to domestic assets are distinguished from returns to foreign assets by having a non-zero probability
of "expropriation" denoted by ￿D.
Expropriation include factors such as nationalisation of assets, periods of domestic instability which might
lower the returns to domestic investment, capital controls, and direct or implicit taxes faced by foreign and


















;￿;￿ > 0 (3)
where Kd and Kf denote domestic and foreign capital asset holdings respectively. For adjustment costs, the






















;c;d > 0 (5)
All of a, b and ￿D might be a⁄ected by policy intervention that raises the friction cost of moving capital
assets across international boundaries. The net present value of the expected return on a portfolio of capital
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0 are the initial holding of domestic and foreign capital assets respectively. Equations 7 and 8
characterise the intertemporal equilibrium for both the foreign and domestic capital assets. An important
point to note is that the optimal assets holdings as characterised by the intertemporal equilibria are asym-
metrical between domestic and foreign assets by virtue of the presence of expropriation risk on domestic
asset holdings. Our concern is with the mix of foreign and domestic assets in the portfolio of agents in the
intertemporal equilibrium.
4The mix of the foreign to domestic assets in the portfolio of agents in the intertemporal equilibrium can




0. $K is de￿ned as the ratio of the stock of foreign to domestic capital holdings after agents have







￿ (￿ ￿ c￿)(1 ￿ ￿D)
￿ [(1 ￿ ￿D)￿ ￿ a￿]
(9)
According to equation 9, the portfolio mix is a function of marginal rate of return, marginal costs of
adjustment and expropriation risk factors. To the extent that our interest lies in the impact of the host
(domestic) country￿ s property rights on FDI, our focus must be on the condition @$K
@￿D > 0. The condition
has important implications for the FDI- institutions link question. It shows that rising expropriation risk,
which is synonymous to weak property rights, will in equilibrium reduce the host country￿ s assets in the
international investors￿portfolio. This is because expropriation negatively a⁄ects the marginal returns to
investment thereby reducing the competitiveness of a country in attracting FDI in￿ ows.
4 A Review of Empirical Literature
4.1 Institutional Determinants of FDI
While theory predicts that investor friendly institutions enhance a country￿ s ability to attract FDI, empirical
work is inconclusive. This is attributed to the di⁄erences in the institutional indicators used in empirical
work. Several studies investigated the impact of property rights on FDI using di⁄erent measures of property
rights. While some studies showed that secure property rights strongly a⁄ect the levels of FDI positively,
other studies found an insigni￿cant e⁄ect.
Gastanaga et al (1998) conducted an investigation of the impact of a number of institutional variables
on FDI. The study used a panel of 22 less developed countries over the period 1970 to 1975. The Business
Environmental Risk Intelligent (BERI) nationalisation risk index was used to proxy for property rights. The
index is rated on a 0 to 4 scale with higher scores representing higher levels of institutional e¢ ciency. They
found a positive and signi￿cant relationship between the FDI-GDP ratio and the BERI nationalisation risk
index demonstrating that low levels of nationalisation risk promote FDI in￿ ows.
Stein and Daude (2001) used the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index of expropriation of
private property to proxy for property rights. The index is rated on a 0 to 10 scale, with lower ratings
given to countries where expropriation of private investment is a likely event. They obtained a positive and
signi￿cant relationship between FDI in￿ ows and the expropriation index. Again, their results suggest that
more secure property rights increase FDI in￿ ows.
The Li and Resnick (2003) study on the e⁄ect of political democracy on FDI yielded important results for
the FDI-property rights link question. The study used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel Correlated
Standard Errors for a sample of 53 developing countries for the period 1982 to 1995 to investigate their
theoretical proposition that democratic political institutions a⁄ect FDI in￿ ows to developing countries via
two competing causal links. Using the Knack and Keefer (1995b) property rights index constructed from
the ICRG dataset, they found that increases in democracy yield improved property rights which in turn
encourage FDI in￿ ows to developing countries. Besides this positive indirect link, democracy is found to
have a negative direct e⁄ect on FDI in￿ ows.
Another study linking FDI and property rights is by Fedderke and Romm (2006). The study undertook
an investigation of the determinants of FDI in￿ ows in South Africa over the period 1956 to 2003. They
5controlled for property rights and political instability using South Africa￿ s time-series institutional indices
constructed in Fedderke et al. (2001). Using the Johansen Vector Error Correction Modelling (VECM)
technique, they found that stronger property rights signi￿cantly a⁄ect real FDI stocks positively.
More recently, Benassy-Quere et al (2007) argued that most empirical studies linking FDI and institutions
do not account for the problem of endogeneity. Endogeneity arises when the existence or absence of FDI
puts pressure on governments to improve institutions causing a reverse causality. They estimated a gravity
equation for bilateral FDI stocks which takes into account the role of institutions in the host country as well
as the source country. The problem of endogeneity was tackled by the use of a three-stage procedure for
instrumentation and orthogonalisation. Using the Fraser Institute property rights index, estimations were
done for a panel of 41 transition countries for the period 1985 to 2000 as well as a cross-section of the same
countries for the year 2000. Their ￿ndings showed that property rights protection is only signi￿cant and
positive in the panel estimations but not signi￿cant in the cross-sectional estimations.
With the exception of the Fedderke and Romm (2006) study on South Africa, all of the above studies use
either cross country or panel data in their empirical work. The major reason for the limited country-speci￿c
empirical evidence on the impact of property rights on FDI is that existing institutional indicators are only
available for short time periods and therefore not useful in country-speci￿c studies.
4.2 Non-Institutional Determinants of FDI
The literature on FDI has proposed various macroeconomic determinants of FDI. The relationship between
such variables and FDI depends on whether the FDI is horizontal or vertical. Horizontal FDI occurs when
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have headquarters at home and production plants at home and abroad
that produce the same good. The major motive for horizontal FDI is to expand the MNCs markets. Vertical
FDI, on the other, hand occurs when MNCs fragment di⁄erent stages of production by having headquarters
at home and production plants in di⁄erent foreign countries that produce di⁄erent intermediate or ￿nal
goods. Vertical FDI is driven by the MNCs￿search for e¢ ciency in production, particularly lower input
costs.
The market size of the host country, usually measured by real GDP, is considered an important determi-
nant of horizontal FDI and is consistently statistically signi￿cant in empirical work.6 The theoretical linkage
emanates from the fact that a larger market allows ￿rms to bene￿t from economies of scale that arise from
low distribution costs and bulk-buying of inputs, among other things.
Openness of the domestic economy is also seen as an important determinant of FDI. Openness is in￿ uenced
by direct FDI restrictions as well as trade barriers. FDI restrictions clearly raise barriers to FDI and are
likely to in￿ uence the choice that MNCs make with regards to investment location. Two views of the motives
for FDI give contradictory predictions regarding the e⁄ects of trade liberalisation on FDI. The view of FDI
and trade being substitutes sees tari⁄-jumping as the motive for FDI, and hence trade liberalisation should
negatively a⁄ect FDI. In a liberalised trade environment, exporting goods from the home country is relatively
more attractive than FDI as a way to serve the regional market. The alternative view sees FDI and trade as
complements. This applies, in particular, to vertical FDI where a liberal trade environment is a prerequisite
for international division of labour at the ￿rm level.7
The link between the capital intensity of the host country￿ s industries and FDI has also generated interest
in recent studies. Most transition and developing economies are presumed to have a comparative advantage
in the production of goods that are relatively labour-intensive. If FDI is motivated by MNCs￿search for
6See Globerman and Shapiro (1999) and Sethi et al (2003) for evidence on Canada, 17 West European countries and 11
Asian countries that receive investments from U.S MNCs, Morisset (2000) for evidence on African countries and Asiedu (2005)
for evidence on 22 African countries.
7See the discussion in Nicoletti et al (2003). See also Globerman and Shapiro (1999), and Blomstrom and Kokko (1997).
6lower labour costs, then FDI will ￿ ow into industries that have relatively low capital-labour ratios. This
normally holds for vertical FDI searching for low labour costs. By contrast horizontal FDI tends to ￿ ow
into capital intensive sectors. The the link between FDI and the host country￿ s capital intensity is therefore
ambiguous depending on the whether vertical or horizontal FDI dominates FDI in￿ ows.8
Several studies consider the quality of human capital in the host country. The absence of educated and
healthy workers can pose a signi￿cant deterrent to MNCs entry. This is especially the case with e¢ ciency-
seeking FDI where access to a highly skilled workforce is essential. Some studies have shown that a more
highly educated and skilled workforce is essential to FDI.9 While the quality of human capital is an important
determinant of FDI, the general labour market conditions will determine the MNCs￿ability to tap into the
labour resources of the host countries. It is argued that labour market conditions that impose extra costs
on investors tend to curb FDI in￿ ows. For example, strict employment protection legislation and high
labour tax wedges impact negatively on FDI returns thereby discouraging FDI in￿ ows. In addition, strict
employment protection legislation makes it more di¢ cult for MNCs to respond to supply and demand shocks,
thus increasing the variability of FDI returns and the risk that investors face in the host country.10
Other common explanatory variables of FDI are the host country￿ s corporate tax rates and the availability
of infrastructure. With regards to the corporate tax rates, results have not been consistent.11 The availability
and quality of infrastructure (transportation, communications and energy supply) a⁄ects FDI positively
because good infrastructure lowers transaction and production costs and increase the attractive of a country
as an investment destination.12
The choice of our empirical model in equation 10 draws upon our theoretical framework. Other explana-


















The variables are de￿ned in appendix A. We use FDI stocks rather than FDI ￿ ows as the dependant variable
for two reasons. First, stocks are much less volatile than ￿ ows which are sometimes dependent on one or
two large takeovers, especially in relatively small countries. Secondly, the long term contribution of FDI to
domestic investment (and therefore policy stance towards FDI) may be better re￿ ected in accumulated FDI
stock data (Read, 2007).
A priori, we expect that secure property rights have a positive e⁄ect on FDI. This is in line with the NIE
theoretical argument that strong institutions are key to reducing uncertainty and transaction costs that arise
in economic exchange. This in turn would enhance the host country￿ s ability to attract FDI. The market
size of the host country is expected to have a positive e⁄ect on FDI. This would be in support of the market
size hypothesis that larger markets are a source of economies of scale which enhances returns to investment
leading to more FDI. The e⁄ect of trade openness could either be positive or negative depending on whether
horizontal or vertical FDI dominates as explained in the above section. The link between the host country￿ s
industries￿capital intensity and FDI is also ambiguous. It can either be positive or negative depending on
the whether labour-intensive (vertical) FDI or capital-intensive (horizontal) FDI dominates.
The ratio of external debt to GDP is expected to carry a negative coe¢ cient because when the govern-
ment￿ s external debt burden increases, the likelihood of a balance of payments crisis also increases. This may
attract the imposition of restrictions on pro￿t and dividend remittances by the host country￿ s government
8See for example Fedderke and Romm (2004) for evidence in South Africa.
9See for example Mody and Srinivasan (1998) , Globernan and Shapiro (2002) and Asiedu (2005).
10See for example Sethi et al (2003) and Nicoletti et al (2003).
11While Gastanaga et al(1998), and Wei (2000) show that taxes and tari⁄s have a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI,
Wheeler and Moody (1992) ￿nd an insigni￿cant relationship.
12See Wheeler and Moody (1992) , Loree and Guisinger (1995) and Globerman and Shapiro (2002).
7in order to curb out￿ ows of foreign capital. MNCs facing the risk of being unable to remit pro￿ts to their
mother companies will be discouraged. Lastly, human capital is expected to have a positive e⁄ect of FDI by
providing the skills required by MNCs.
5 Econometric Methodology
We employed the standard Johansen estimation technique13 for multivariate cointegration to estimate the
long-term determinants of FDI. In its general form, an unrestricted VAR is speci￿ed as follows:
Zt = A1Zt￿i + AmZt￿m + ￿ + ￿t (11)
Where Zt is an n x 1 matrix of endogenous variables, m is the lag length, ￿ is the matrix of deterministic
terms and ￿ is a Gaussian error term. Reparametrisation provides the VECM speci￿cation:
4Zt = a0 + a1t + ￿Zt￿i +
p￿1 X
i=1
￿i 4 Zt￿i + "t;t = 1;2:::n (12)
The existence of r cointegrating relationships amounts to the hypothesis that:
H1 (r) : ￿ = ￿￿
0
(13)
Where ￿ is a p x p matrix, ￿ is a p x r matrix of the speed of adjustment to equilibrium and ￿ is also p x r
matrix of long run coe¢ cients. ￿ and ￿ are assumed to be of full rank. Therefore, H1 (r) is the hypothesis
of reduced rank of ￿. When r > 1, that is, when we have more than one cointegrating relationship, issues of
identi￿cation arise14 and should be resolved by means of restrictions on the loading matrix (￿), the matrix
representing short run dynamics and the cointegration space.(￿).15
Following Pesaran and Shin (1995b), we take a theory-guided approach to impose just-identi￿cation
restrictions shown in equation 14.16. While our theoretical framework suggests the existence of a long run
relationship between FDI and its institutional and macroeconomic determinants, we expect a strong feedback
e⁄ect from FDI to output (GDP). The theoretical hypothesis is that FDI possesses some technological spill
over e⁄ects through the introduction of more advanced technology and management practices. This in turn
is expected to enhance productivity and output in the host country (Borensztein et al. 1998). Theory
therefore supports the existence of two long-run relationships, one explaining FDI and the other explaining
13Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1991, 1992).
14Wickens (1996), Johansen (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996).
15Greenslade et al (1999).
16The choice of this restriction is based on the fact that Zimbabwe￿ s major trading partner is South Africa and the two
countries have always enjoyed an open trade regime even when Zimbabwe has been isolated from the rest of the world. In this
regard, changes in the trade policy of the country are not expected to yield any direct signi￿cant impact on foreign capital
in￿ows. A more relevant measure would be one that captures openness to foreign capital
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The estimates of the long-run parameters ￿ij contain no information about the speed of adjustment of the
variables to deviations from the equilibrium. Instead, the size and signs of each error correction term (ECT),
￿ij represents the direction and speed of adjustment of the system to its long run equilibrium after a shock.
In estimating equation 14, issues of endogeneity arise. We cannot rule out a priori that institutions
(property rights in this case) are endogenous to FDI. Daude and Stein (2007) noted that endogeneity arises
between FDI and institutions because when investors are located in a foreign country, they might become
a constituency that demands better institutions. This creates feedback e⁄ects from FDI to institutions. If
estimation proceeds in the presence of endogeneity, the resulting parameter estimates will be biased. It is
therefore necessary to determine the directions of association between the variables in our model.
We employ the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (PSS henceforth) F-test to determine the directions of associa-
tions between the variables in our empirical speci￿cation. According to Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), the



















the assumption ￿xy = 0, it follows that:
4xt = ax0 + ax1t + ￿xxxt￿1 +
p￿1 X
t￿1
￿xi 4 Zt￿i + "xt;t = 1;2:::n (15)





i 4 Zt￿i + !
0
4 xt + ut;t = 1;2:::n (16)
The speci￿cations of c0, c1, ! and ￿ are de￿ned in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). From equation 15, it









t=1 in the short
run still remains.
The PSS F-test is based on the hypothesis that ￿yx = 0 under the sequential treatment of all variables
in the speci￿cation as the outcome variable. Acceptance of the hypothesis establishes the absence of a level
relationship, hence weak exogeneity for the y-variable speci￿ed under the test.
To operationalise the PSS F-test, we consider the Conditional Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
9error correction model of our empirical speci￿cation given by:
4LFDI = ’o + ’1t +
2 X
i=1
￿i 4 LGDPt￿i +
2 X
i=1
￿i 4 LRATIOt￿i +
2 X
i=1







￿i 4 OPENt￿i +
2 X
i=1
￿i 4 LPROPERTt￿i + ’3LFDIt￿1 + ’4LGDPt￿1 + ’5LRATIOt￿1
+ ’6LEDEBTt￿1 + ’7LEDUCt￿1 + ’8OPENt￿1 + ’9LPROPERTt￿1 + vt
The order of augmentation is determined by the need to render the error term free of systematic variation,
in order to extract the long run relationship. The null of no long run relationship (H0 : ’3 = ::: = ’9 = 0)
is tested against the alternative by means of the F-test. This test statistic has a non-standard distribution
irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) provide two asymptotic
critical values. The upper bound denoted FU assumes that all variables are I(1) and the lower bound denoted
FL assumes that all variables are I(0).
Where the estimated
a
F > FU, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that a long run relationship is
present between the dependant variable and all the other variables in the model. If
a
F < FL then the null
of no long run relationship cannot be rejected. When FL <
a
F<FU , result of the inference is inconclusive.
The PSS F-test does not require the pretesting of the variables in the model for unit roots, an advantage it
enjoys over the Johansen VECM approach.
6 Findings
In accordance with the requirements of the VECM technique, the top panel of table 3 reports the results of
the ADF test for unit roots.
[Insert table 3 about here]
The results con￿rm that all of the variables in the model except LRATIO are I(1). Regarding the variable
LRATIO, the ADF tests would not reject the null hypothesis of a second unit root. An examination of the
plot of the ￿rst di⁄erence of LRATIO in appendix B, ￿gure (d) proves instructive. It shows that around 1974,
the variable LRATIO was a⁄ected by an exogenous shock which would not be realizations of the underlying
data generation process. This is not surprising given that 1974 marks the beginning of intensi￿ed political
instability related to the war in Zimbabwe. The surge in political instability in 1974 is shown by the political
instability index obtained from Gwenhamo et al. (2008) and reproduced in appendix B, ￿gure (f).
To test this hypothesis, we made use of the test proposed by Perron (1989) which allows for a shift in
the intercept and/or the slope of the trend function. We apply the Perron (1989) model B (i.e. the changing
growth model). The results shown in the lower panel of table 3 allow us to clearly reject the existence of
a second unit root, so that we conclude that LRATIO is an I(1) variable. Other variables that seem to
have been subjected to substantial structural breaks are FDI in 1998, EDUC in 1985, EXDEBT in 1998 and
OPEN in 1999. Upon the examination of the ￿rst di⁄erences of the variables in appendix B, it is clear that
LDEBT and OPEN are stationary after the ￿rst di⁄erence even in the presence of structural changes but
it is not so obvious that LFDI and LEDUC are stationary after the ￿rst di⁄erence. We therefore subject
LFDI and OPEN to the Perron(1989) test. The results corn￿rm that all these varibles are I(1) subject to
the existence of structural breaks.
The results of the PSS F-test are shown in table 4. At the 5% level of signi￿cance, we reject the null
hypothesis of the absence of a level relationship when LFDI, LGDP and LEDUC are dependent variables.
This implies that LFDI, LGDP and LEDUC are endogenous or outcome variables. We however fail to
10reject the null hypothesis of the absence of a level relationship when LDEBT, OPEN and LPROPERT are
independent variables and conclude that LDEBT, OPEN and LPROPERT can be treated as long-run forcing
or weakly exogenous variables. The result that LPROPERT is weakly exogenous rules out the problem of
simulteneity between FDI and institutions (property rights). The results are inconclusive in the case of the
varible LRATIO.The existence of more than one endogenous variables renders a single equation approach
inappropriate for estimating the parameters of our model. The Johansen multivariate approach is more
suitable.
[Insert table 4 about here]
We now turn to the Johansen test for cointegration. Table 5 reports the trace and maximal eigenvalue
test-statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors under the assumption of unrestricted intercepts and
restricted trends.17 Given our small sample size, we follow the maximal eigenvalue statistic indicating two
cointegrating vectors. This result concurs with our a priori theory-guided expectation.
[Insert table 5 about here]
We now turn to the interpretation and discussion of the long-run parameter estimates reported in table


























The error correction terms in column B of table 7 represent the short run dynamics for each equilibrium
relationship. The error correction term ECT1t￿1 for the LFDI vector in equation 17 is -0.02. Equation 18,
the LGDP vector has an error correction term ECT2t￿1 of -0.09. Since, both error correction terms are
between zero and minus two and statistically signi￿cant, it indicates that the estimated relationships are
potentially stable dynamically. Although statistically signi￿cant, the error correction (adjustment) terms
indicate a very slow adjustment to the long run equilibrium.
We start o⁄ by interpreting the coe¢ cients in the LFDI vector. LPROPERT has a positive and statis-
tically signi￿cant e⁄ect with an elasticity of 1.09. LPROPERT is a de jure property rights index rated on
a 0 to 100 scale with higher scores representing more secure formal property rights. The positive coe¢ cient
therefore implies that an improvement (deterioration) in the rating of de jure property rights in Zimbabwe
is associated with an increase (decrease) in FDI. This supports the theoretical proposition by the NIE that
secure property rights encourage FDI by reducing risks, transaction costs and uncertainty.
A plausible transmission mechanism is that the enactment of laws which a⁄ect security of private property
directly in￿ uence the risk ratings of a country which in turn in￿ uence foreign investors location decisions.
For example, between 2000 and 2003, when the Zimbabwean government enacted several laws allowing
compulsory acquisition of land with no compensation to the landowners, the World Bank risk premium on
investment in Zimbabwe jumped from 3.4% to 153.2%. Earlier studies by Gastanaga et al (1998), Li and
Resnick (2003), Fedderke and Romm (2006) and Asiedu (2005) also found a positive link between FDI and
secure property rights.
[Insert table 6 about here]
LRGDP has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect with implied elasticity of 1.01. This con￿rms the market
size hypothesis which says that larger markets are a source of economies of scale. This enhances returns to
17See for example Mafusire (2004) for the same assumption on the relationship between FDI, trade and GDP in Zimbabwe.
11investment thereby attracting FDI. Our result is similar to that of Mafusire (2004) who obtained a positive
and signi￿cant relationship between GDP and FDI in￿ ows in Zimbabwe for the period 1967 to 1994. The
￿nding also con￿rms Asiedu￿ s (2005) results of a positive relationship between FDI and GDP for a group of
22 African countries, including Zimbabwe.
LEDEBT has a negative and statistically signi￿cant long-run coe¢ cient of -0.26. This supports the notion
that increasing government external debt burden results in uncertainty regarding future policy towards
foreign capital, which will discourage FDI. Besides, a high government external debt burden may be an
indication of weak macroeconomic policies by the Zimbabwean Government. Ramirez (2005) also obtained
a negative and statistically signi￿cant relationship between Chile￿ s external debt burden and FDI stock.
LRATIO has a negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient of -1.66. This suggests that FDI in￿ ows
are biased towards sectors with low capital intensity. The direct implication of this ￿nding is that FDI is
dominated by vertical FDI searching for low labour costs. LEDUC has a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient
of 0.65 indicating that human capital acts as pull factor of FDI by providing necessary skills for e¢ cient
production.18
Regarding the political instability dummy variables, LINVERSION has a negative and statistically sig-
ni￿cant coe¢ cient of -0.02. and 70sWAR is statistically insigni￿cant. The negative link between LFDI and
political instability is consistent with results of Schneider and Frey (1985) who found that political instability
reduces FDI in￿ ows for a group of middle-income and low-income countries.
We now turn to the LGDP vector represented in equation 27. Although the LGDP vector is likely to be
underspeci￿ed, all variables carry the a priori expected signs. LFDI and LEDUC have positive and signi￿cant
e⁄ects of 0.65 and 0.77 on LGDP respectively. This supports the Borensztein et al (1998) notion that FDI has
productivity-enhancing e⁄ects when the host country absorptive capacity, measured by its stock of human
capital, is high. As expected, capital intensity (LRATIO) and trade openness (OPEN) contribute positively
to GDP with coe¢ cients of 0.66 and 1.42 respectively.
The dummy variables, LINVERSION and 70sWAR, have negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients
equal to -0.169 and -0.092 respectively. The impact of LINVERSION outweighs that of 70sWAR.This implies
that the war-time political instability was less detrimental to output when compared to land inversion which
occurred between the end of 1999 and 2003.
We now check for the robustness of the long-run parameter estimates. First, we include a dummy variable
which takes a value of one between 1976 and 1992, a period during which no signi￿cant new foreign capital
in￿ ows were realised. We assume the same just-identifying and over-identifying restrictions as in the base-
line model. The parameter estimates are shown column C of table 6. Our earlier results are robust to the
inclusion of this dummy variable. In the cointegrating vector of interest, the LFDI vector, LPROPERT
carries a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on LFDI. All other variables maintain the signs they had in the
baseline model. Changes only occur in the magnitudes of the estimates.
Secondly, we use an alternative property rights index denoted LPRFH instead of LPROPERT to proxy
for property rights. LPRFH is the log of the property rights index in the freehold tenure system in which all
MNCs own their properties, including farms and mines. The di⁄erence between LPRFHZ and LPROPERT
is that the latter only tracks formal laws governing property rights in the freehold tenure system, whereas the
former tracks formal laws regulating ownership in all tenure systems including those that are not necessarily
market-based. The results are reported in column D of table 6. Again, the just-identifying and over-
identifying restrictions are the same as in the baseline model.
The results in the LFDI vector show that property rights have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI
with an elasticity of 0.65. The magnitude of the impact is, however, lower than that of the original property
rights index. All other variables in the LFDI vector maintain their signs as in the baseline model but, the
18See, for example, Globernan and Shapiro (2002) and Asiedu (2005) for the same result.
12magnitudes of impacts are slightly lower when compared to the baseline model. In the LGDP vector, only
the magnitude of the variables changed but all signs are maintained as in the baseline model.
7 Conclusion
The paper sets out to examine the impact of property rights on FDI in Zimbabwe for the period 1964 to 2005
using the Johansen VECM technique. For this purpose, the study employs the variables identi￿ed by the
literature as important in explaining FDI together with a newly constructed de jure property rights index
obtained from Gwenhamo et al (2008) to proxy property rights in Zimbabwe.
An extensive study of the literature was carried out to inform the speci￿cation of the long-run relationships
to be estimated. The a priori speci￿cation was complemented by the PSS F-test to test for the forcing and
outcome variables. Following this, the Johansen methodology was used to test for the number of cointegrating
relationships and to estimate the long-run parameters and adjustment parameters for the Zimbabwean FDI
function. Robustness checks for the long-run parameter estimates were also carried out.
There are two salient features emanating from the empirical investigations of this paper. Firstly, the
results indicate that secure property rights signi￿cantly a⁄ect FDI positively. The ￿nding is robust to the
use of an alternative de jure property rights index. Even after controlling for periods of no signi￿cant
new foreign capital in￿ ows, property rights were consistently an important explanatory variable of FDI in
Zimbabwe.
However, the study does not ￿nd evidence of feedback e⁄ects from FDI to the de jure property rights
index. This resolves the concerns raised by Benassy-Quere et al (2007) that most studies do not account for
the problem of endogeneity which arises when there is reverse causality between institutions and FDI.
Secondly, non-institutional determinants of FDI were also found to be important. It was shown that GDP
has a positive impact on FDI. Results also supported the presence of feedback e⁄ects from FDI to GDP
con￿rming the notion that FDI has some productivity-enhancing e⁄ects in the host country. In addition,
the external debt burden, capital intensity and political instability have negative and statistically signi￿cant
e⁄ects on FDI. Human capital positively a⁄ects both FDI and the GDP.
Overall, the study suggests that property rights, political instability and macroeconomic variables jointly
a⁄ect the levels of FDI stocks. The main policy implication of the study is that the political elite should
ensure that the institutional structure protects the property rights of the broad cross-section of the society
so as to promote FDI. Another policy suggestion is that neither institutional reforms nor macroeconomic
adjustment alone can e⁄ectively induce FDI. Rather, policy should be aimed at achieving macroeconomic,
institutional and political stability to improve the attractiveness of the country to foreign investors.
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Figure 1: Net Foreign Direct Investment inflows in Zimbabwe, 1980-2005 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and development (UNCTAD)   
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Table 1: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows Indicators 
  Net Total Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
Year  Net total inflows in US$  %  of  Gross  Fixed  Capital 
Formation  % of GDP 
1970-1979  18.47  3.35  0.59 
1980-1989  -4.88  -0.40  -0.06 
1990  -12.22  -0.76  -0.14 
1991  2.79  0.16  0.03 
1992  19.00  1.26  0.18 
1993  38.00  2.45  0.58 
1994  41.00  2.78  0.60 
1995  117.70  6.73  1.66 
1996  80.90  5.24  0.95 
1997  135.10  8.88  1.60 
1998  444.30  35.55  7.32 
1999  59.00  7.46  0.99 
2000  23.20  2.66  0.31 
2001  3.80  0.31  0.08 
2002  25.90  1.16  0.08 
2003  30.00  2.94  0.38 
2004  60.00  7.44  1.28 
















Table 2: Major Sources of FDI inflows in Zimbabwe in 1998 
Target Company  Source Country   Value of transaction 
US $ million 
     
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe  South Africa  16 
J.Pelham  South Africa  22 
Hunyani Holdings  South Africa  7 
Eureka Gold Mine  Australia  24 
Indarama Gold Mine  Canada  15 
Pickstone-Pearless Gold Mine  Canada  4,25 
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe  United Kingdom  10.9 
Source: Makola (2003) 
 
Table 3: ADF and Perron Unit Root Tests. 
ADF Unit Root Tests. 
Variable  Levels  First  Differences  Second Differences 
             
LFDI  1.42  -0.52  -4.44*  -4.68*     
LGDP  -2.26  -0.48  -3.68*  -4.46*     
OPEN  -2.53  -2.49  -7.07*  -6.98*     
LEDEBT  -1.87  -3.05  -3.02*  -4.21*     
LPROPERTZ  -1.54  0.59  -5.19*  -6.22*     
LPRFHZ  -0.15  -1.02  -4.96*  -5.91*     
LEDUC  -1.65  -2.27  -3.34*  -3.46*     
LRATIO  -3.51  -2.23  -1.32  -2.32  -5.95*  -5.86* 
Perron Unit Root Test with Structural breaks 
LRATIO    -2.02    -3.82*     
LFDI    -1.49    -4.12*     
LEDUC    -o.93    -4.89*     
Notes:  * denotes the rejection of the null of non-stationarity at the 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 4: PSS F- Tests 
Dependant Variable  F-statistic  Interpretation 
  4.66*  Outcome variable 
  4.98*  Outcome variable 
  3.02†  Inconclusive 
  1.50  Forcing variable 
  4.80*  Outcome variable 
  1.80  Forcing variable 
  1.26  Forcing Variable 
Notes: 1) Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Pesaran and Pesaran (1997: 478) case III: Intercept and 
trend for k=7. At 5% significance level:   and  =3.883.  
2) * denotes the rejection of the null of no long run relationship at the 5% levels of significance respectively and † 






Table 5: Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Statistics for Cointegration 
Unrestricted intercepts and no trends, Order of the VAR = 2   
Null  Alternative  Max Eigen 
Value 




r = 0  r = 1   82.553*  46.970  44.010 
r<= 1  r = 2   41.606*  40.890  37.920 
r<= 2  r = 3  31.383  34.700  32.120 
r<= 3  r = 4  14.676  22.160  9.790 
         




r = 0  r = 1  198.8936*  128.7900  123.3300 
r<= 1  r = 2  116.3406*  97.8300  93.1300 
r<= 2  r = 3  74.7347*  72.1000  68.1300 
r<= 3  r = 4  43.3525  49.3600  46.0000 
Notes:* denotes rejection of null at the 5% level of significance 
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Table 6: Long-run and Short-run Parameter Estimates 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
 




LFDI  LGDP  LFDI  LGDP  LFDI  LGDP  LFDI  LGDP 
LFDI  -1  0.736 
(1.61) 
-1  0.651* 
(3.25) 
-1    0.644** 
(1.74) 







































0.0000  -0.256* 
(3.01) 
0.0000  -0.169* 
(6.05) 
0.0000 
















OPEN  0.000  1.502** 
(1.88) 




0.000  1.497** 
(1.92) 
0.000  1.591* 
(2.24) 






0.0000  1.046* 
(2.03) 
0.0000  ----  ---- 






















LR Test of 
restrictions 
----  ----          (1) = 0.265[0.871] 
Accepts restriction 
         (1) = 0.001[0.974] 
Accepts restriction 
            (1)= 0.205[0.651] 
Accepts restriction 
 
Short-run Parameter Estimates 
 




















































































----  ----  1976-1992  ---- 
Notes:1) Figures in round and square brackets are absolute t-statistics and p-values respectively. 2) * and ** denotes significance at 5% 






Appendix: Description of Variables, Data Sources and Time Series Plots of Variables  
A. Variable Description and Data Sources  
Variable   Description  Source 
LFDI  Log of  Real FDI Stocks at 2000 prices 
 
   
See Appendix C for 
details 
 
LRGDP  Log of Real Gross Domestic Product at 2000 prices  World Bank Indicators  
 
LRATIO  Log of the Capital-Labor Ratio  See Appendix D for 
details 
 
LEXDEBT  Log of the ratio of external debt to GDP 
 





Financial Statistics  
 
LEDUC  Log of the Barro and Lee’s proportion of the population 
above 25 years with completed post-secondary education. 
 
The Barro and Lee 
(1993) Educational 
Attainment Data Base 
 
LPROPERTZ  Log of the Property Rights Index for Zimbabwe  Gwenhamo et al (2008) 
LINVERSION  Dummy variable for the socio-political unrests during the 
illegal land inversions between 2000 2003. 
 
70sWAR  Dummy for the war-time political instability between 
1974 and 1979.  
 
 
D98  Dummy for the once-off surge in FDI stocks in 1998.  
 
 
DU74  Dummy for the stagnant fixed capital formation between 
1974 and 1988. 
 
 
DEDUC  Dummy for the structural change in the educational 
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C. Construction of the Real FDI Stocks for Zimbabwe, 1964 to 2005  
The UNCTAD data set on FDI stocks starts in 1980 and is inadequate for the purposes of this 
study. We generated the real FDI stocks in Zimbabwe million dollars for 1964 to 2005 using 
the standard perpetual inventory model
1 of the following form  , where 
 is the stock of capital at time t-1,   is the flow of investment during the period t and   is 
the rate at which the capital depreciates.  
We used the annual FDI inflows adjusted for remittances of profits and dividends. The net 
FDI inflows data is obtained from the UNCTAD FDI data base which covers the period 1970 
to 2005. The 1964 to 1969 FDI inflows data is obtained from the Balance of Payments (BOP) 
data extracted from the Economic Surveys of Southern Rhodesia and published in McKinnell 
(1969) and Stoneman (1976). The initial stock of FDI in 1963 is obtained from Stoneman’s 
computation  based  on  the  1963  Central  Statistical  Office  (CSO)  survey  of  the  external 
corporate investments in Southern Rhodesia and published in Clarke (1980).  
The FDI net inflows as well as the initial FDI stock are converted to the Zimbabwe dollar 
using the World Bank conversion factor and deflated by the GDP deflator with 2000 as the 
base  year.  Following  the  UNCTAD  practise,    is  assumed  to  equal  zero  so  that  no 
depreciation is allowed for. The resulting index of the FDI stocks is shown below. The surge 
in  FDI  stocks  in  1998  resulted  from  the  liberal  reforms  brought  about  by  the  Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of 1990. 
 
Real Foreign Direct Stocks in Zimbabwe, 1964-2005 
 
                                                 
1 See Ramirez (2000, 2005) for a similar approach in the cases of Mexico and Chile. 
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D.  Construction of the Capital-labour Ratio for Zimbabwe, 1964 to 2005 
The capital-labour ratio is computed by dividing the total physical capital stock by the size of 
the labour force. The capital stock is computed using the above explained standard perpetual 
inventory approach. Real GFCF is used for investment data. Although it would have been 
ideal to use private sector GFCF, available data sources do not distinguish between private 
and state capital. The initial capital stock is estimated by aggregating the real GFCF in the 
period 1960 to1963. In the subsequent years,  is assumed at 5%. We divide the real capital 
stock by total labour force to obtain the capital-labor ratio. The labour force data is obtained 
the  World  Bank  Development  Indicators  online  database.  The  diagram  below  shows  the 
resulting capital-labour ratio. 
 
Capital Labour-Ratio in Zimbabwe, 1964-2005 
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